A steady demand for green products from concerned consumers has led companies to introduce new product lines that match or exceed consumer environmental concerns. Nonetheless, not all the organizations were able to achieve significant returns on their investments in green products. These failures are generally attributed towards companies’ inability to overcome consumer scepticism towards the performance of functional and green attributes of their brands to generate a positive green image and green value in consumers mind. Therefore, the question arises that (...) does the success in promoting green brand image and value depend on consumer existing perceptions about the brand quality and credibility? This study analyzes the influence of brand perceive quality and credibility on consumer perceptions towards a brand green image, green value and green equity. A theoretical model with hypothesized relationships is developed and tested to answer these research questions. Data have been collected from the consumers of electrical and electronic goods. The hypothesized relationships were tested with the help of structural equation modeling procedure. The results suggest that brand perceived quality and its overall credibility does have a significant influence on generating a greener image, green perceive value and green brand equity. (shrink)

In this paper, I criticize the thesis that value-laden approaches in American philosophy of science were marginalized in the 1960s through the editorial policy at Philosophy of Science and funding practices at the National Science Foundation. I argue that there is no available evidence of any normative restriction on philosophy of science as a domain of inquiry which excluded research on the relation between science and society. Instead, I claim that the absence of any exemplary, professional philosopher who discussed the (...) relation between science and society sufficed to narrow the focus of philosophers of science, given the institutional stabilization of the domain within professional philosophy from 1959 onwards. (shrink)

In this paper, we investigate how the life and work of Louis Rougier relate to the broader political dimension of logical empiricist philosophy. We focus on three practical projects of Rougier in the 1930s and 1940s: first, his attempts to integrate French-speaking philosophers into an international network of scientific philosophers by organizing two Unity of Science conferences in Paris; second, his role in the renewal of liberalism through the organization of the Walter Lippmann Colloquium; and third, his attempts at political (...) negotiations between Great Britain and the Vichy regime during the Second World War. These activities of Rougier in the 1930s and 1940s have so far never been discussed as part of a unified project on his part. Based on our investigations of these practical projects of Rougier, we argue that his relation to logical empiricist philosophers should primarily be understood on the level of action. His projects aimed to proliferate the concrete improvement of society and the lives of its citizens by expunging all metaphysical questions and speculations from the sphere of social discourse. Rougier conceived logical empiricist philosophers as allies to achieve such practical effects in society. (shrink)

This article provides information about Berne's financial situation at the time the Economic Society was founded. The canton was in an exceptionally fortunate position, having accumulated a sizeable cash reserve that was in part used for loans and investments on the London capital market. Throughout the century, the Bernese government followed a very cautious investment strategy. The main reason for purchasing overseas securities was that they helped the patricians to become independent from tax-paying subjects. Economic imperatives ruled out increases of (...) the cash reserve or further involvement in the overcrowded domestic capital market. However, by investing abroad Berne became increasingly dependent on the goodwill of its debtors, for which it was criticised by the Economic Patriots amongst others. (shrink)

In this paper I investigate how intellectual problems concerning an epistemology of history and a historical view of knowledge played a role in the network of logical empiricist philosophers between 1930 and 1945. Specifically, I focus on the practical efforts of Hans Reichenbach and Otto Neurath to incorporate these intellectual stakes concerning history. I argue that Reichenbach was mainly concerned with creating more institutional space for scientific philosophy. Consequently, he was interested in determining his relation to historically oriented philosophy on (...) the practical level only. Otto Neurath, I claim, was interested in promoting an intellectual incorporation of an epistemology of history and a historical view of knowledge into the Unity of Science movement. His attempts, however, largely failed. I conclude that the intellectual stakes concerning history did have an effect within the network of logical empiricist philosophers, but that, by 1945 these stakes were entirely dissolved. The displacement of the network to the United States removed Reichenbach’s practical problems, while Neurath was unable to persuade enough actors before his death. (shrink)

A discussion of the intersections between Aristotle's works: Ethics and Metaphysics. It debates the ways in which - and even the extent to which - the two texts illuminate one another, examine Aristotle's methods and intellectualism and analyse issues of matter, form, potency and art.

I argue that Carl Hempel’s pioneering work on scientific explanation introduced an assumption that Hempel never motivated, namely, that explanation is an aim of science. Ever since, it has remained largely unquestioned in analytic philosophy of science. By expanding the historical scope of the debate on explanation to philosophers from the first half of the twentieth century, I show that the debate should include a critical reflection on Hempel’s assumption. This reflection includes two problems: how to motivate one’s position on (...) the aims of scientific knowledge and how to decide which examples count as expressions of those aims. (shrink)

This paper situates Carl Hempel's 1942 paper "The Function of General Laws in History" within a broader debate over the philosophy of history in American academia between 1935 and 1943. I argue that Hempel's paper was directed against German neo-Kantianism, and show how the German debate over historiography continued between 1939 and 1943 in the context of New York through the contributions of German philosophers who operated in the same intellectual network as Hempel, namely Paul Oskar Kristeller and Edgar Zilsel. (...) Whereas this debate still witnessed many different philosophical approaches, Hempel's logico-analytic methodology would come to dominate analytic philosophy of history. (shrink)

Research on religion can advance understanding of social cognition by building connections to sociology, a field in which much cognitively oriented work has been done. Among the schools of sociological thought that address religious cognition are: structural functionalism, symbolic interactionism, conflict theory, phenomenology, and, most recently, exchange theory. The gulf between sociology and cognitive science is an unfortunate historical accident.

Introduction -- Direct algorithms of decompositions of matrices by non-orthogonal transformations -- Direct algorithms of decompositions of matrices by orthogonal transformations -- Direct algorithms of solution of linear equations -- Iterative algorithms of solution of linear equations -- Direct algorithms of solution of eigenvalue problem -- Iterative algorithms of solution of eigenvalue problem -- Algorithms of solution of singular value decomposition.

This article investigates the various ways in which Rudolf Carnap incorporated contemporary epistemological problems concerning the Geisteswissenschaften in Der logische Aufbau der Welt. I argue that Carnap defends a nonreductive incorporation of the Geisteswissenschaften within the unity of science. To this end Carnap aims to solve the problem of individuality, which was the focus of attention for important philosophers of the Geisteswissenschaften such as Wilhelm Dilthey, Heinrich Rickert, and Wilhelm Windelband. At the same time, Carnap argues that his constitutional method, (...) which transforms cultural objects into psychological or physical objects, does not imply a loss of autonomy for the Geisteswissenschaften. Besides this defense of autonomy, Carnap incorporates several central notions of the contemporary theory of the Geisteswissenschaften into his theory of the Aufbau: cultural manifestation, the phenomenology of cultural experience, and the method of Verstehen. (shrink)

Scientific models are used to predict and understand the target phenomena in the reality. The kind of epistemic relationship between the model and the reality is always regarded by most of the philosophers as a representational one. I argue that, complementary to this representational role, some of the scientific models have a constructive role to play in altering and reconstructing the reality in a physical way. I hold that the idealized model assumptions and elements bestow the constructive force of a (...) model on the reality. By recognizing the physical constructive force of some scientific models, the merit of these models could be judged by how successful they are in the reality construction, rather than by the traditional criterion of model-world representation. (shrink)

The dialogue is a common search for truth, because its aim is to gain insight into reality through the interplay of its participants. The dialogue form, i.e. an exchange of thought processes, reflects the structure of the human mind which is involved in an ongoing process of reflections and constructions. This process mirrors consciously and unconsciously the centrifugal and centripetal movements of the human body and of all organic matter. For these reasons, I argue that the praxis of dialogue represents (...) a truly human lifestyle, not limited to one specific worldview. Its form reveals implicitly various levels of meaning. (shrink)

The common root of the humanist and mythological traditions is the projection of a cosmological and spiritual desire, reflected in mythic archetypes such as Venus or the Statue of Liberty in the harbor of New York City. The philosophical companion of Renaissance Venus is Eros as the all-compassing force in nature, and the philosophical correlate of the Statue of Liberty is Immanuel Kant's das Ding an sich. I focus on the intimate reladonship between the domain of artistic imagination and philosophical (...) discourse: the apparent difference is due to the separation between philosophy, science, and the arts since the Enlightenment. Closer scrutiny reveals that the same content is hidden in the various vessels of our modern and postmodern time. Reason and imagination seem to have gone different roads, but I will try to show that they are inseparably interconnected. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Spiritual Experience and Psychopathology”Andrew Sims (bio)In examining this interesting paper, we need first of all to understand what the authors are doing. They are not taking the conceptual vehicles of “spiritual experience” (SE) and “psychotic phenomena” (PP) for a gentle outing, but exposing both of them to the hardest road test they can devise. From 1,000 accounts of “spiritual experiences” that were already so dramatic that those (...) involved were prepared to describe them, the authors selected three which most successfully blurred the boundaries between SE and PP. So we are not exploring whether these concepts have general practical validity, but whether their mutual frontiers are discrete or overlapping. The authors’ task is legitimate, but it needs to be recognized for what it is.Unusual spiritual experiences are interpreted by the authors as psychotic symptoms, and the definitions of the Present State Examination (PSE) descriptions are cited to justify this. However, we have known for a long time that using instruments for purposes for which they were not designed can produce unexpected results; it is rather like washing socks in a dishwasher and being surprised that it does little good to the socks. The PSE was devised for categorizing and quantifying existing psychiatric disorders in epidemiological studies. The further one gets from this, its true purpose, the less satisfactory it becomes as an instrument. A better way of evaluating symptomatology in an individual case is a skilled and painstaking interview by a well-trained descriptive psychopathologist. One can only conclude from the authors’ use of the PSE in distinguishing SE from PP, that the instrument itself is not capable of doing this, which is not really very surprising. One can form no views on the concepts of SE and PP themselves, except that in some circumstances they may be difficult to tell apart.It would be easy to dispute whether Simon’s beliefs were delusions. Believers from many religious backgrounds “know” that God gives them thoughts or ideas, and it requires detailed psychopathological examination, and not the application of a questionnaire, to distinguish this from the much more concrete experience as described in PSE of “inserted thoughts.”Rating scales, be they assessments of the quality of teaching in primary schools or quantification of established psychotic symptoms, are necessarily only a pale reflection and an over-simplification of the skilled work that professionals undertake. To imply that because a score could be given on the PSE to an otherwise healthy woman who describes the frequent experience of hearing God’s voice, denies the validity of her experience, but also affronts the professional skills of a trained psychopathologist. When psychiatrists, or even [End Page 79] untrained research workers, use the PSE they are presumably doing so as part of an epidemiological research study, and the validity of their individual result is evened out by results from a number of other subjects. If a psychiatrist is trying to decide whether Sara had “true” hallucinations, he or she will carry out a psychopathological interview in which the criteria for establishing true hallucinations are much more sophisticated than is possible in a questionnaire, and the interview will be individualized. Sara’s significant statement, “but God doesn’t take your free will away,” immediately distinguishes her diagnosis from schizophrenia. It was good that Sara’s priest did not need detailed knowledge of psychopathology to come to a common-sense evaluation of her experience.It was with some feelings of disappointment that I realized that when the authors use the word “psychotic” they merely mean that a tick could be placed in an appropriate box for the PSE. If one were to carry out an investigation of serum electrolytes on a fit athlete on completion of a marathon, one would get bizarre and probably abnormal results. For a quantified investigation to be meaningful, one must always take account of the context.When I read these three cases as a psychopathologist, I find no convincing psychotic phenomena, and the three human beings were undoubtedly not psychotic at the time of expression of their religious experiences. The word psychosis is not helpful in psychopathology: if one looks more specifically in these cases for the phenomena... (shrink)

ion is one of the important processes in scientific modeling. It has always been implied that abstraction is an agent-centric activity that involves the cognitive processes of scientists in model building. I contend that there is an autonomous aspect of abstraction in many modeling activities. I argue that the autonomous process of abstraction is continuous with the agent-centric abstraction but capable of evolving independently from the modeler’s abstraction activity.

In this paper I argue that Carnap in the Aufbau and in his later writings consistently conceives the humanities and the social sciences as domains of knowledge that are epistemically equal to the natural sciences. I show that Carnap was skeptical about the philosophical theories of Dilthey, Rickert and Windelband which aimed to distinguish the natural sciences from the humanities through a logical criterion. Although Carnap in the Aufbau integrated some terminology from Dilthey, Windelband and Rickert, he never accepted their (...) philosophical questions about the humanities as legitimate. In his later writings, following Otto Neurath, he openly distanced himself from terminology that could be associated with such questions, and he never again spoke in a programmatic fashion about cultural concepts, like he had done in the Aufbau. (shrink)

In this paper I trace Ernest Nagel’s earliest ideas on explanation by investigating his course-notes of the 1930s. At Columbia University there was an increasing interest in the study of Aristotle. As I show, Nagel’s focus on the explanatory aim of science originated from his reading of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. Through his teaching of Aristotle, Nagel inspired his New York colleagues to focus on a philosophical analysis of explanation. I claim that this resulted in Carl Hempel’s earliest work on scientific (...) explanation. Although scientific explanation was not a central topic for philosophers of science in the 1940s or 1950s, Hempel and Nagel’s interest in the topic helped to canonize it in a period when the topics and methods in philosophy of science became increasingly standardized. (shrink)

Wittgenstein & logical empiricism Rudolf Carnap and Ludwig Wittgenstein share many philosophical interests: an admiration of Frege’s formal logic, an anti-metaphysical stance and a modernist aesthetic aimed at removing superficial elements from discourse or thought. Despite their shared interests, Carnap and Wittgenstein ended their interaction in a plagiarism dispute. In this essay, I discuss which metaphilosophical reasons lie behind their dispute. I argue that Wittgenstein’s overarching philosophical project stood in direct conflict with Carnap’s. First, Wittgenstein never accepted that there are (...) meaningful sentences about the language of science. Thus, there could be no meaningful reflection on science, and this nullified Carnap’s Logic of Science project. Second, Wittgenstein had an overall disdain for Carnap’s desire, as displayed in the Manifesto and the Aufbau, to reform philosophical activity as a part of science itself in tandem with a general reform of the place science in society. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Clinical CommentarySim Kang, Associate ProfessorRegarding the question of whether to disclose the incidental finding or not to the 72-year-old subject, one needs to consider several issues pertaining to the elderly subject, investigator team, informed consent process, illness under examination and wider societal and cultural context. First, in terms of the subject, would keeping the incidental finding secret in the context of the informed consent be respectful of the wishes (...) of the subject? One needs to bear in mind that consent was taken with the understanding that assessments will not be further shared with the subject as the assessments were done in the research study to generate new data and were not part of clinical evaluation or treatment. In one sense, autonomy of the subject in agreeing and consenting to the study investigations must be respected and the subject is comfortable that no results of the extensive assessments (blood tests and brain scans which are performed at baseline and annually for three years prospectively) will be proffered in the course of the project. At a more personal level, it may also be that the subject prefers not to know of any incidental findings even if present, which in some cases may be related to cultural notions of abnormal findings and ill health.Second, from the standpoint of the research team, would awareness of the space-occupying lesion but not informing the subject constitute a breach of ethical principles of beneficence and non maleficence? When the subject is enrolled in a research study, it is understood that the balance between research risks and benefits should have been evaluated in favour of the latter. Although more needs to be clarified to determine the clinical significance of the lesion, there is a possibility that the lesion may be malignant which would pose [End Page 289] further challenges. If the lesion is detected early, there may be a likelihood of early intervention, including surgical or non-surgical options. If the lesion of undetermined stage at present is not treated expediently and expeditiously, is there a possibility of it progressing to a stage when delayed treatment may be less effective? In this aspect, the welfare of the subject needs to be kept in mind. Even if nondisclosure is opted, is it just to allow the subject to continue in the longitudinal study if the small intracerebral lesion turns out to be malignant or that treatment may be rendered less effective over time?Third, with regard to the informed consent procedure, does the patient fully appreciate the details and implications of the study including not sharing laboratory or neuroimaging evaluations? For the process of informed consent to be meaningful, there are three elements that need to be present, namely adequate and appropriate disclosure of details about the study, demonstration of understanding of the information presented, as well as voluntariness in participation. Pertaining to adequate disclosure, was there appropriate disclosure and discussion of some of the key aspects of the study, including prospective nature lasting three years, repeated measurements and no sharing of details of assessments? The subject needs to have an appreciation of the impact of the information beyond intellectual comprehension. Was he or she cognisant of the number of visits over the entire course of the study as well as the amount of time involved for each visit? What was the response of the subject when it was made known that additional information obtained from the study evaluations will not be revealed or disclosed?Factors that may influence the understanding in this case include older age with possible easier fatigability and shorter attention span, severity of illness with related level of cognitive impairment, educational level, and familiarity with research procedures, all of which are unclear in this case at this point. With respect to voluntariness, was there any undue coercion or influence that may compromise the respect for autonomy of the research subject? It is noteworthy that the team has painstakingly committed to retake the consent before each follow up (thrice over three years) and that the subject can withdraw from the participation in the study at any point in time. Were there factors that may affect the willingness of the subject... (shrink)

Pictorial representations such as diagrams and figures are widely used in scientific literature for explanatory and descriptive purposes. The intuitive nature of pictorial representations coupled with texts foster a better understanding of the objects of study. Biological mechanisms and processes can be clearly illustrated and grasped in pictures. I argue that pictorial representations describe biological phenomena by telling stories. I elaborate on the role of narrative structures of pictures in the frontier research using a case study in immunology. I articulate (...) that pictures with an inherent narrative structure are crucial in biological sciences. (shrink)

Open Dialogue is an approach to working with mental health problems that emphasises promoting dialogue between multiple perspectives within an individual person and between all the people present, including the therapists. Therapists’ own perspectives are often introduced during conversations called reflections, which present a potential source of different perspectives. Using conversation analysis we analysed 14 hours of video-recorded Open Dialogue sessions with a focus on therapists’ reflections. We noticed that therapists did not display explicit agreement with each other’s reflections. This (...) absence of explicit agreement was displayed through a variety of verbal and non-verbal forms. Eliding agreement facilitated deference to the epistemic authority of the client, assertion of epistemic rights from second position, emphasis of a positive perspective or to voice multiple perspectives. Therapists avoided consensus and thus presented multiple perspectives to the family while also attending to issues of contingency. The implications of epistemic primacy and asymmetry connected to sequential structures in talk pose a challenge to the generation of collaborative reflective dialogues. (shrink)

Mechanisms consist of component parts and processes organized in a specific way to produce changes that may give rise to one or more phenomena. I aim to examine the generative mechanism of generative material models in the production of new material models. A generative material model in biology is a living material model that is capable of generating new material models. I contend that generative mechanisms of a generative material model are not to be conflated with biological mechanisms: the former (...) is a mechanism manipulated and altered by the modeler while the latter is a naturally occurring mechanism. I examine the ways in which idealization may contribute to the generative mechanism in generating new model organisms. I articulate that the component parts and activities in a generative mechanism are to a large extent shaped by idealization in generative material modeling. Although biological mechanisms do have a role to play in the generation of model organisms, I propose that we shall view the generative mechanism as a hybrid of biological mechanisms and modeling activities. I shall argue that the notion of generative mechanisms as hybrid mechanisms is different from the extant conceptions of mechanisms in various aspects. (shrink)